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FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND FREEDOM FROM STUDENTON-STUDENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS: THE NEXUS BETWEEN TINKER V. DES MOINES
INDEPENDENTCOMMUNITYSCHOOL DISTRICTAND DAVIS V
MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
LYNN MOSTOLLER*
INTRODUCTION
Two recent cases emphasize the difficulty public school administrators face in
walking the line between sexual harassment liability and the unconstitutional
suppression of student speech. On February 14, 2001, the Third Circuit ruled that
the State College Area School District (SCASD) anti-harassment policy was
unconstitutionally overbroad.' The challenge was brought by two Christian students
and their legal guardian, David Saxe, a member of the Pennsylvania State Board of
Education, because "they feared they were likely to be punished under the Policy for
speaking out about their religious beliefs, engaging in symbolic activities reflecting
those beliefs, and distributing religious literature."2 Of particular concern was their3
"right to speak out about the sinful nature and harmful effects of homosexuality."
Two weeks later, a U.S. District Court in Nevada ruled that gay high school
student Derek Henkle may have a constitutionally protected right to disclose his
sexuality.4 Henkle alleged that other students had repeatedly and severely harassed
him. School administrators responded to the problem by transferring him to new
schools with instructions not to talk about his sexual orientation.' In addition to
possible First Amendment violations, the court further held that both the individual
school administrators and the school district could be held liable for punitive
damages under a Title IX sexual harassment claim.6 On August 28, 2002, this case
settled, with Henkle receiving $451,000 from the school district.7 In addition, the
school district implemented numerous policy changes in response to the ruling, most
notably an express recognition that "students' freedom of expression includes the
rights to disclose their sexual orientation at school and to discuss issues related to
sexual orientation in school settings. '' 8 Fifteen additional changes were made to the

* Class of 2004, University of New Mexico School of Law. I want to thank my faculty advisor, Sheryl
Wolf, for her encouragement and insightful suggestions; my editor, Samantha Adams, for her meticulous and
intelligent guidance; my family for their support; and my partner, Kathy McKnight, for her love and our life
together.
I. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
2. Id.
at 203.
3. Id.
4. Henkle v. Gregory, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (D. Nev. 2001).
5. Id. at 1075-76.
6. Id. at 1078. See infra part If.
7. Lambda Legal, Groundbreakinig Legal Settlement Is First to Recognize Constitutional Right of Gay and

Lesbian Students to Be Out at School and Protected from Harassment (Aug. 28, 2002), at http://www.lambda
legal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=1 119.
8. Lambda Legal, Summary of the Policy Changes Adopted as a Result of the Settlement in Henkle v.
Gregory (Aug. 28, 2002), at http://www.lambdalegal.orglcgi-binliowa/documents/record?record=1122.
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district policy on discrimination, harassment, and sexual harassment, all in response
to Henkle's suit.9
The source of legal support for these two cases sparks additional interest in these
issues. Derek Henkle was represented by Lambda Legal Defense Fund, "a national
organization committed to achieving full recognition of the civil rights of lesbians,
gay men, bisexuals, transgendered people, and people with HIV or AIDS through
impact litigation, education, and public policy work."' ° In Saxe v. State College Area
School District,David Saxe was represented by the American Family Association
Center for Law and Policy. The Center represents Christian litigants in cases
"involving first amendment free speech and free exercise rights as well as the
constitutional issues involved in the continuing battle against pornography and
obscenity."" Adding the perspectives of the litigation support organizations to the
oppositional posture of the cases particularly intensifies the contrary holdings. These
courts are moving in opposite directions with respect to harassment on the basis of
sexual orientation and interest in the decisions extends far beyond the individual
litigants.
From a First Amendment perspective, however, the cases are reconcilable. In
both cases, protected speech in the public school setting is expanding: gay teens are
empowered to discuss their sexual orientation at school without interference and
Christian students may voice their religious opposition to the homosexual lifestyle.
This comment will explore the tension between First Amendment and peer-sexual
harassment law and the difficulties that tension poses for public school
administrators. Parts I and II present the overall backdrop of First Amendment and
Title IX student-on-student sexual harassment law. Part I analyzes the recent
developments in cases and the intersection of the two lines of jurisprudence. Part IV
offers an independent analysis of how the two standards interrelate. Finally, part V
advises school administrators on drafting and implementing anti-harassment policies
that avoid liability on both fronts, yet foster a respectful, safe, and academically rich
environment.

9. Id. Summary of changes: The policy now requires "regular student education about harassment and
sexual harassment and intimidation" and "regular training of all staff (to take place at least every other year)
regarding the prevention of an improper response to harassment, sexual harassment and intimidation of students."
Coverage of the policy was expanded to include harassment based on non-conformity to gender stereotypes. The
policy was also amended to "extend the previous prohibition on discrimination and harassment based on race, color,
national origin, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability or religious preference to cover such discrimination regardless
of whether the characteristic is 'actual or perceived."' Modifications were made in the area of intervention and
reporting obligations. Now staff must "promptly stop" behavior in violation of the policy and report it. In addition,
the school district is mandated to "report to law enforcement any harassing conduct that is violent or criminal."
Additional changes were made to the student grievance procedure and the schools' response to peer harassment.
Id.
10. Lambda Legal, About Lambda Legal, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/about (last visited
Mar. 8, 2003).
It. AFA Online: American Family Association, Centerfor Law and Policy,at http://www.afa.net/clp/ (last
visited Mar. 8,2003).
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I. FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A. The Supreme Court Cases Addressing Student Speech
Three main Supreme Court of the United States cases dominate the legal analysis
of free speech issues in public schools. The first, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,12 established that schools may suppress student speech
only when it substantially interferes with the functioning of the school or the rights
of other students.' 3 In the next case, Bethel School DistrictNo. 403 v. Fraser,4 the
Court carved out an apparent exception for lewd and vulgar student speech. 5
Finally, in the third case, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,'6 the Court
determined that schools have more control over school-sponsored student speech.' 7
This section outlines those three opinions and explores the dissenting concerns that
abandonment of the single Tinker standard caused confusion and opened the door
to draconian censorship of student speech.
1. The Substantial Interference Test
In 1969, the Supreme Court adopted a new rule involving the application of First
Amendment speech protections within the public school environment." The holding
in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District established that
public school students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate."' 9 In that case, the Court held that students
could express themselves, even their controversial opinions, as long as they did not
"substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of
other students."2 The expression examined in Tinker was the wearing of black
armbands in protest of the Vietnam War. School administrators preemptively
established a policy prohibiting students from wearing the armbands. Students who
refused to remove the armbands were suspended from school until they complied.
The suspended students then challenged the constitutionality of the restriction.
While the Court noted the major degree of controversy the U.S. involvement in
Vietnam had provoked, 2' it held that school officials could not institute a prohibition22
on expression based solely on their "fear or apprehension of disturbance.
Significantly, the Tinker Court recognized personal interactions between public
school students as "an important part of the educational process."'23 Such interactions had to be linked to some actual disruption or disturbance in order to justify
suppressive measures from school administrators. School officials had to

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id. at 509.
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Id. at 685.
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Id. at 273.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 510 n.4.
Id. at 509.
/d. at 512.
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demonstrate that their "action was caused by something more than a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint., 24 In reaching this decision, the Court recognized the need to balance the
free speech rights of students and the needs of school officials to "control conduct
in the schools. 25 The balancing test requires a showing of substantial interference
with the work of the school or the rights of others before school administrators may
limit student expression. 26
2. Authority to Prohibit Lewd and Indecent Speech
In 1986, the Supreme Court established an exception to the Tinker rule. In Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser,the Court concluded that a sexually explicit
nominating speech given by a student at a school assembly was not constitutionally
protected. In response to the speech, school authorities suspended Matthew Fraser
for three days and removed his name from the list of candidates for graduation
speaker at the school's commencement exercises.28 The Court pointed to "the
marked distinction between the political 'message' of the armbands in Tinker and
the sexual content of [Fraser's] speech. 29 While upholding Tinker, the Court
acknowledged that "the constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."30 Noting that
"it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of
vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse,"'" the Court held that public schools
had the authority to sanction students for using lewd and indecent speech. The Court
further conceded that the school board has the authority to determine "what manner
of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is appropriate. 32 Therefore, school
officials have the power to suppress lewd and indecent speech and have great
latitude in defining what speech is prohibitively offensive.
3. A Third Rule for School-Sponsored Speech
Two years later, the Supreme Court revisited the student-speech issue in
Hazelwood School Districtv. Kuhlmeier3 3 and added another exception to the Tinker
rule. In that case, the Court examined a school administrator's authority to control
the content of a student-written (and student-edited) school newspaper. The
newspaper was produced as part of a journalism course, and prior to publication the
principal objected to two articles. The first was a story about teen pregnancy and the
other explored the effects of divorce on students at the school. The Court expressly
upheld Tinker, emphasizing that students maintain free speech rights in school and

24. Id. at 509.
25. Id. at 507.
26. Id. at 509.
27. Fraser,478 U.S. at 685.
28. Matthew Fraser was then elected as a write-in candidate and was permitted to deliver the graduation
address following a ruling in his favor from the district court. Id. at 679.
29. Id. at 680.
30. Id. at 682.
31. Id. at 683.
32. Id.
33. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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citing the substantial interference rule. The Court distinguished this case from
Tinker, though, ruling that schools have more control when student speech is
"disseminated under its auspices." 34 A key point to the analysis involved
determining the nature of the forum involved. If the school paper were a public
forum, the official would not be able to censor the content. The Court first
determined that the school paper was not a public forum. Much of the analysis was
devoted to explaining that the school paper was part of the educational curriculum,35
an area where schools exercise greater control.36 Federal judges generally defer to
the expertise of local educators in questions involving curricular choices. 37 The
Court ultimately held that, because the paper was not a public forum and was a
component of the curriculum, it was school-sponsored. 38 Thus, the principal had the
authority to remove the articles he found objectionable. The Court reached this
decision by distinguishing school-sponsored speech from the speech of a particular
student as protected in Tinker.39 The opinion emphasized that the Tinker standard
was not applicable to situations "when a school may refuse to lend its name and
resources to the dissemination of student expression."' In establishing this new
standard, the Court afforded great discretion to school officials, holding that courts
should only intervene when "the decision to censor a school-sponsored publication,
theatrical production, or other vehicle of student expression has no valid educational
purpose."'4 Thus, school-sponsored speech became a second category of student
speech firmly within the regulatory power of the public school.
4. Concerns over Abandonment of the Single Tinker Standard and Censorship
Notably, in Fraserand Hazelwood the majority cited to Justice Black's dissenting
opinion in Tinker. The FraserCourt quoted Justice Black as follows: "'I wish,
therefore .... to disclaim any purpose... to hold that the Federal Constitution compels
the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control of the
American public school system to public school students.""'2 The Hazelwood Court
noted that sentiment, 3emphasizing that the Fraser Court found the passage
"especially relevant."'4 By relying on the Tinker dissent, the Court appeared to be
reestablishing school authority in certain categories of speech and, in the process,
limiting the Tinker holding.
Curiously, the majorities in both Fraser and Hazelwood also expressly upheld
Tinker. Each case, however, explained this facial contradiction by distinguishing
Tinker. The FraserCourt highlighted the political nature of the speech in Tinker,
noting that the decision upheld "the students' right to engage in a nondisruptive,

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 272.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 267-70.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 272-73.
Id. at 273.
Fraser,478 U.S. at 686 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting)).
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 n.4 (quoting Fraser,478 U.S. at 686).
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passive expression of a political viewpoint." 4 The Hazelwood Court focused not on
the nature of the speech, but the relationship of the school to the speech. There, the
Court distinguished "particular student speech '" 5 as addressed in Tinker from
"school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive
activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school."' 4' Both majorities conceded that, in
either case, the speech at issue would likely have been protected outside the school
setting.47 Thus, while students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate, ' 48 they appear in certain circumstances
to shed at least a few of them at some other nebulous doorway.
The minority opinions in Fraser and Hazelwood raised concerns over the
abandonment of the Tinker standard and the censorship permitted under the
categorical exceptions. In an opinion concurring in the Fraser result, Justice
Brennan confined his analysis to the established Tinker standard, noting that "the
Court's holding concerns only the authority that school officials have to restrict a
high school student's use of disruptive language in a speech given to a high school
assembly., 49 In his dissent to Fraser,Justice Marshall noted the school district's
"failure to demonstrate that respondent's remarks were indeed disruptive,"5 again
relying on the Tinker standard.
These concerns are more directly articulated in Justice Brennan's Hazelwood
dissent. There, Brennan admonished the majority for abandoning the Tinker test.5
Of particular concern to him was the majority's decision to uphold Tinker but not
apply it to school-sponsored speech. Brennan lamented that "[t]he Court today casts
no doubt on Tinker's vitality. Instead it erects a taxonomy of school censorship,
concluding that Tinker applies to one category and not another. '52 In analyzing the
majority's three reasons for establishing a separate standard for school-sponsored
speech, Brennan emphasized that the Tinker standard addresses "the public
educator's prerogative to control curriculum,"53 that "the pedagogical interest in
shielding the high school audience from objectionable view points and sensitive
topics" '54 is "illegitimate," 55 and that "the school's need to dissociate itself from
student expression... is readily achievable through less oppressive means."56 Of
particular concern to Justice Brennan was a school official's ability, under the guise
of audience shielding, to censor content to the point of becoming "an Orwellian
'guardianship of the public mind.""' He stressed that the principal's solution to the

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Fraser,478 U.S. at 680.
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270.
Id. at 271.
Fraser,478 U.S. at 682; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
Fraser,478 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, I., concurring).
Id. at 691 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 283 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 281.
Id. at 282.
Id.
Id. at 283.
Id.
Id. at 286 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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school's need to distance itself from the student expression in the school paper was
not sufficiently "narrowly tailored.""8 In Justice Brennan's view, the principal's
decision to cut two full pages of a six-page publication amounted to "brutal
censorship"59 when the publication of a simple disclaimer would have satisfied the
need for dissociation. 6° In sum, the dissent in Hazelwood highlights the lack of
necessity and the danger in abandoning the Tinker standard.
As underscored by Justice Brennan's concerns, there has been a shift away from
a single Tinker standard. The Fraserdecision established a separate rule for lewd
and obscene speech and Hazelwood drew a distinction between the speech of a
particular student and school-sponsored speech. This departure from Tinker has
complicated the analysis of school-speech issues. Courts must first select the
appropriate test before applying any of the standards, rather than simply determining
the level of interference with school activities or the rights of others. The following
survey of federal appeals court cases demonstrates how difficult and convoluted
such analysis has become.
B. Interpretationof the Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood Trilogy
The circuit courts agree that the Supreme Court has established that students
require special considerations with respect to First Amendment rights. 6 In addition,
the appeals courts regard Fraserand Hazelwood as limits to the Tinker substantial
interference standard, thereby giving school officials greater latitude to restrict
student speech under certain conditions.62 There is significant variation, however,
among the circuits with regard to which circumstances trigger the more flexible
standards and what additional powers they bestow on school administrators to limit
student speech.
The Third and Ninth Circuits follow the most straight-forward interpretive
framework, concluding that the Supreme Court holdings organize student speech
into three categories: (1) lewd, vulgar, obscene, and plainly offensive speech; (2)
school-sponsored speech; and (3) speech that falls in neither of these categories.63
These courts further agree that Frasergoverns the first category, Hazelwood is
controlling when school-sponsored speech is at issue, and the Tinker standard
applies in all other circumstances. 64 The courts determine from the facts of a
particular case which category of speech is implicated and apply the corresponding

58. Id. at 289.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Saxe, 240 F.3d at 211-12; Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1992);
Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 442-43 (5th Cir. 2001); Castorina v. Madison County Sch. Bd.,
246 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir. 2001); Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1535-37 (7th Cir. 1996);
Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 923 (10th Cir. 2002); Henerey v. St. Charles Sch. Dist., 200
F.3d 1128, 1131 (8th Cir. 1999); Denno v. Sch. Bd. of volusia County, 218 F.3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2000).
62. See Saxe, 240 F.3d at 212-14; Chandler, 978 F.2d at 527-29; Canady, 240 F.3d at 442; Castorina, 246
F.3d at 540; Muller, 98 F.3d at 1536-38; Fleming, 298 F.3d at 923-24; Henerey, 200 F.3d at 1132; Denno, 218 F.3d
at 1271-74.
63. See Chandler, 978 F.2d at 529. See also Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 988-89 (9th Cir.
2001); Saxe, 240 F.3d at 214; Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg'l Bd. of Ed., 307 F.3d 243, 254 (3d Cir. 2002).
64. See, e.g., Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 253-54; Saxe, 240 F.3d at 211-14; Chandler, 978 F.2d at 529; La Vine,
257 F.3d at 988-89.
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standard. Under this scheme, the analysis determining the proper categorization of
student speech significantly impacts the overall holding. Under Fraser and
Hazelwood, the courts are extremely deferential to school officials, applying a
reasonableness standard,6 5 whereas the Tinker standard requires a much stricter
showing of substantial disruption or interference with the work of the school or the
rights of other students before student speech may be suppressed.66
At first glance this approach appears sound, but several courts disagree with overgeneralizing the Tinker holding.6 The Fifth Circuit has particularly criticized the
classification of Tinker as a catchall category for any student speech that cannot be
classified as either obscene or school-sponsored.68 Instead, the Fifth Circuit
interprets Tinker as a case involving the restriction of specific student viewpoints.69
In Canadyv. Bossier ParishSchool Board, the court examined a mandatory uniform
policy, a restriction that the court regarded as viewpoint neutral.7" After assuming
that a choice in attire was protected by the First Amendment and determining that
such a restriction involved neither obscenity nor school sponsorship, the court
expressly rejected the application of the Tinker strict-scrutiny standard to a
viewpoint-neutral school regulation.7
The Tenth Circuit has acknowledged the categorical approach described above72
but recently reformulated the main categories of speech that occur within a school
setting and highlighted a circuit split over the interpretation of Hazelwood.73 In
Fleming v. Jefferson County School District, the court determined that the three
main categories of speech are (1) student speech,74 (2) government speech,75 and (3)
school-sponsored speech.76 In this case, the court examined the constitutionality of

65. See Chandler, 978 F.2d at 527 ("'The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in
school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board,' and not with the federal courts." (quoting
Fraser,473 U.S. 683; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267)). See also LaVine, 257 F.3d at 988; Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 25354; Saxe, 240 F.3d at 213.
66. See Saxe, 240 F.3d at 211; Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 253; Chandler, 978 F.2d at 527; LaVine, 257 F.3d
at 989.
67. See Canady, 240 F.3d at 443 (concluding that Tinker should only govern the regulation of speech that
is viewpoint specific). See also Castorina,246 F.3d at 540 (noting that Tinker is "consistent with a number of later
Supreme Court decisions signaling that viewpoint-specific speech restrictions are an egregious violation of the First
Amendment"); Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch., 9 F.3d 1295, 1297 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Tinker for the
proposition that "[s]chools may not prohibit their pupils from expressing ideas"); Muller, 98 F.3d at 1542 ("The
student's right to express a point of view in a public school is only as extensive as 'the special characteristics of the
school environment' permit." (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506)).
68. Canady, 240 F.3d at 442-44.
69. Id. at 442.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 441-43.
72. See Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2000). "[E]xtensive case law in 1993 supported the
proposition that school authorities may not penalize students for their speech when that speech is non-disruptive,
non-obscene, and not school-sponsored." Id. at 1030.
73. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 923-29.
74. Id. at 923. The court noted that Tinker governs student speech that "happens to occur on the school
premises," id., and Frasercontrols when student speech is "[v]ulgar," "lewd," and "plainly offensive." Id. at 923
n.4.
75. Id. at 923 ("[Tlhe First Amendment does not preclude the government from exercising editorial control
over its own medium of expression." (quoting Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1144 (10th Cir.
2001))). The court identified "the principal speaking at a school assembly" as an example of government speech
in a school setting. Id.
76. Id.
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various school-imposed restrictions in a project memorializing the 1999 shootings
at Columbine High School. The Jefferson County School District invited students
and other involved community members to paint individual tiles that would be
permanently displayed throughout the school. The school established guidelines
prohibiting participants from painting "religious symbols, the date of the shooting,
or anything obscene or offensive."77 Because this was "student speech that a school
'affirmatively.. .promote[s],' as opposed to speech that it 'tolerate[s],' ' ,78 the court
determined that the project involved school-sponsored speech and was governed by
Hazelwood. In applying the Hazelwood standard, the court used a three-step
analysis. The Tenth Circuit determined that under Hazelwood a school may suppress
student speech when (1) the school reserves a nonpublic forum,79 (2) the speech
"bears the imprimatur of the school and involves pedagogical interests,"8 and (3)
8
the school's "actions are 'reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.'" 1
Most significantly, the Fleming court held "that Hazelwood allows educators to
make viewpoint-based decisions about school-sponsored speech."82 In reaching this
determination, the court took notice of a circuit split on the issue of school
suppression of viewpoint speech. This holding aligns the Tenth Circuit with the
Third and First Circuits in the view that Hazelwood does not require "that schools'
restrictions on school-sponsored speech be viewpoint neutral., 83 Applying this
interpretation of the Hazelwood analytical framework, the Tenth Circuit upheld a
viewpoint-based restriction of religious symbols84because it was reasonably related
to the school's articulated educational interests.
The Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits engage in a more ad hoc
approach to the Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood trilogy. While these courts generally
acknowledge the same distinctions among the Supreme Court cases recognized by
the circuits above, they have not expressly categorized areas of speech. These four
circuits have an expansive view of speech restrictions allowed. Each of these courts
has cited Fraserfor the sweeping proposition that schools may reasonably limit

77. Id.at 922.
78. Id. (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71).
79. Id.at 924.
80. Id. at 924-25. The court noted that the imprimatur idea requires an analysis of how closely the school
is connected to the speech and how involved school officials are in "organizing and supervising" the events at issue.
Id. at 925. The court further stated that "substantial deference" is given to educators in the area of pedagogical
concerns because Hazelwood recognized that "'the education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility
of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not the federal judges."' Id. (quoting Hazelwood, 484
U.S. at 273.) In addition, the court emphasized that a number of courts had ruled that "the pedagogical test was

satisfied simply by the school district's desire to avoid controversy within a school environment." Id. at 925-26.
81.

Id. at 926 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273).

82. Id.
83. Id. at 926. See C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 172-73 (3d Cir. 1999); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d
448, 454 (1st Cir. 1993). The Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have reached the opposite conclusion. Fleming,
298 F.3d at 926. See Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719, 727 (6th Cir. 1999); Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v.
Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 1991); Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1319 n.7 (11th Cir.

1989). The Fleming court noted that the Ninth Circuit has subsequently issued an opinion critical of the finding in
Planned Parenthood.Fleming, 298 F.3d at 927 (citing Downs v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003
(9th Cir. 2000)).
84. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 933.
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speech based on their responsibility to teach "habits and manners of civility."85 This
interpretation is contrary to the view that school sponsorship is central to the Fraser
holding, and that the more flexible standard in Fraserand Hazelwood stems from
a school's interest in suppressing student expression only when such expression
could be perceived as school-endorsed.86
Contrary rulings by the Seventh Circuit further highlight ambiguity over the
school-sponsorship and lewdness exceptions. In Hedges v. Wauconda Community
Unit School, the school attempted to regulate the distribution of religious materials
in an elementary school by "proscribing any religious speech that students would
reasonably think the school sponsors."87 In striking down the prohibition as an
unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment, the court admonished the school
for "seeking an easy way out to try to suppress private speech"8 8 and instructed that
"[p]ublic belief that the government is partial does not permit the government to
become partial."89 Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Fraser and
Hazelwood to allow broad suppression of student speech in elementary schools
without overruling Hedges. In Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School, the court
upheld an elementary school's restriction on the distribution of publications that
were "insulting to any group or individuals."9 The Seventh Circuit's reasoning
relied significantly on the Hazelwood Court's use of forum analysis.91 The Seventh
Circuit concluded that as long as an elementary school retained nonpublic forum
status, the Hazelwood reasonableness standard would control.92 In an attempt to
reconcile its holding with Hedges, the Muller opinion stated, "religious speech
cannot be suppressed solely because it is religious,' 93 but added that "religious and
disruptive or hurtful" speech is not so strictly protected. 94
Perhaps the most telling indication that the current standards regulating student
speech are unclear comes from cases analyzing qualified immunity defenses put
forward by school officials. 95 "Under the doctrine of qualified immunity,
'government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
85. Fraser,478 U.S. at 681. See Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1989); Hedges, 9 F.3d at
1301; Muller, 98 F.3d at 1536; Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 1998);
Henerey, 200 F.3d at 1135; Denno, 218 F.3d at 1271.
86. See Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801, 802 (4th Cir. 1988); Denno, 218 F.3d at 1282-84. See also
Jonathan Pyle, Comment: Speech in Public Schools: Different Context or Different Rights?, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
586, 633 (2002) ("Although many courts have interpreted Fraserto carve out an exception to the Tinker disruption
standard for vulgar speech in any context, the Hazelwood case clarified Fraser'sholding, confining it to the schoolsponsored context.").
87. Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1297. Though the court does not specifically cite Hazelwood, the similarity between
the school's restrictions and those allowed by the Hazelwood Court should not be overlooked. Clearly the school
attempted to limit student speech by invoking the Hazelwood exception.
88. Id. at 1299.
89. Id.
90. Muller, 98 F.3d at 1534 n.2.
91. Id. at 1539-40.
92. Id. at 1540.
93. Id. at 1538 (citing Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1297-98).
94. Id.
95. Seamons, 206 F.3d at 1029. In order to overcome a qualified immunity defense, the student plaintiff must
demonstrate that the school official "violated a clearly established law." Id.
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have known."' 96 In Baxter v. Vigo County School Corp., the court upheld a qualified
immunity defense, concluding that an elementary student's right to wear expressive
t-shirts to school was not clearly established.97 The opinion observed that Fraser
"cast some doubt on the extent to which students retain free speech rights in the
school setting. The Tenth Circuit reached a contrary holding in 2000, finding that
case law as of 1993 barred a successful qualified immunity defense on the issue of
a high school student's free speech rights. 99 Most significantly though, the Eleventh
Circuit recently held that, as late as 1995,"° the free speech rights of high school
students were not sufficiently established to defeat a qualified-immunity defense.''
The court surveyed contrasting judicial views on the application of the more flexible
Fraser standard in the high school setting and determined that school officials
should not be held02to a higher standard than judges in deciphering the Tinker-Fraser
legal landscape. 1
C. ThreateningSpeech
A separate line of cases generally controls threatening speech. In Watts v. United
States, °3 the Supreme Court held that threats of violence are not protected under the
First Amendment, and the rule is not limited to the context of the public school."
When such a speech issue is before the court, the first question to resolve is whether
expression was a true threat or protected speech. The courts apply an objective test
that assesses "whether a reasonable person would interpret the purported threat as
a serious expression of an intent to cause a present or future harm."'0 5 If the speech
is judged a true threat, then the government may suppress the speech without a First
Amendment violation. In the public school context, however, if the court determines
the speech was protected, the Tinker line then applies.0 6
Recently, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits addressed threatening speech within the
public school setting. 0 7 In Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District,a divided
Eighth Circuit upheld the expulsion of a student who wrote a threatening letter to

96. Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 737 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
97. Id. at 738. The t-shirts at issue bore the slogans, "Unfair Grades," "Racism," and "I Hate Lost Creek."
Id. at 730.
98. Id. at 737.
99. Seamons, 206 F.3d at 1030-31.
100. Note that 1995 is a full seven years after the Supreme Court's most recent clarification of the standard
in Hazelwood.
101. Denno, 218 F.3d at 1274-75.
102. Id. at 1274.
103. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
104. Id. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). In R.A. V., the Court noted that the government
has an overriding interest in "protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear
engenders and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur." Id. at 388. See also Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). There the Court held that threatening words are "of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality." Id. at 572.

105. Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002). Courts are divided as to
whether the threat should be tested from the perspective of the reasonable speaker or the reasonable recipient. Id.
106. Id. at 633 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
107. Id. See also LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001).
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a female classmate,108 even though the letter was prepared at home and
surreptitiously delivered by a third student."°9 The letter described how the author
"would rape, sodomize, and murder a female classmate who had previously broken
up with him."' 0 The dissenting
opinion rejected the conclusion that the student had
"communicated a true threat"'' and argued that the speech was protected and should
be regulated under the "substantial disruption test in the school setting.""' 2
A similar issue has arisen in two cases from the Ninth Circuit. "' The first
involved a high school student who threatened to shoot her guidance counselor over
a scheduling issue." 4 Though the majority outlined the Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood
trilogy," 5 it upheld a three-day suspension based on the Watts reasoning, controlling
threatening speech." 6 The concurring opinion disagreed with the majority's "threat"
analysis' '7 but agreed that the school had authority to punish her for the statement
under Fraser."' Several years later, the Ninth Circuit allowed a school to
temporarily expel a student based on a violent poem he wrote and asked his English
teacher to critique." 9 This time, the court relied entirely on the Tinker rule 20 rather
than the threatening-speech line of cases. Thus, in some instances, the substantial
interference test may be used as an alternate method of limiting threatening speech
in public schools.
The cases above emphasize the difficulty that current doctrines addressing free
speech in the public school setting pose for the courts. School officials have the

108. Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 619.
109. Id. at 619-20.
110. Id. at 619.
11. Id. at 627 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
113. See Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996); La Vine, 257 F.3d at 981.
114. Lovell, 90 F.3d at 368.
115. Id. at 371.
116. Id. at 371-73. "In light of the violence prevalent in schools today, school officials are justified in taking
very seriously student threats against faculty or other students." Id. at 372.
117. Id. at 375 (Noonan, J., concurring and dissenting).
118. Id.
119. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 983-84. The student gave a poem, "Last Words," to his English teacher for review.
The poem read,
As each day passed, I watched, love sprout, from the most, unlikely places, wich [sic] reminds,
me that, beauty is in the eye's [sic], of the beholder. As I remember, I start to cry, for I, had
leared [sic], this to [sic] late, and now, I must spend, each day, alone, alone, for supper, alone at
night, alone at death. Death I feel, crawlling [sic] down, my neck at, every turn, and so, now I
know, what I must do. I pulled my gun, from its case, and began to load it. I remember, thinking
at least I won't, go alone, as I jumpped [sic] in, the car, all I could think about, was I would not,
go alone. As I walked, through the, now empty halls, I could feel my hart [sic] pounding. As I
approched [sic], the classroom door, I drew my gun and, threw open the door, BANG, BANG,
BANG-BANG. When it all was over, 28 were, dead, and all I remember, was not felling [sic], any
remorce [sic] for I felt, I was, clensing [sic] my soul, I quickly turned and ran, as the bell rang,
all I could here [sic], were screams, screams of friends, screams of co workers [sic], and just
plain, screams of shear horor [sic], as the students, found their, slayen [sic] classmates. 2 years
have passed, and now I lay, 29 roses, down upon, these stairs, as now, I feel, I may strike again.
No tears, shall be shead [sic], in sarrow [sic], forI am, alone, and now, I hope, I can feel,
remorce [sic] for what I did, without a shed, of tears, for no tear, shall fall, from your face, bdt
from mine, as I try, to rest in peace, BANG!
Id. The court noted that the student wrote the piece soon after a school shooting in Springfield, Oregon, where two
students were killed and twenty-five injured. Id.
120. Id. at 988-89.
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additional conundrum of balancing these complex First Amendment concerns with
their responsibility to protect students from sexual harassment. Unfortunately, the
legal system's guidance in the area of sexual harassment is no less convoluted. Case
law on how the standards interact is all but nonexistent, with Saxe being the only
case on point to date.
11. STUDENT-ON-STUDENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
A. The Supreme Court Standard:Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education 2'
In 1999, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized a private action under23
Title IX22 for student-on-student sexual harassment. In a classic five-to-four split,1
the Court held that public schools, as recipients of federal funds, could be liable for
student-on-student harassment if they acted with "deliberate indifference to known
acts of harassment in its programs or activities. ' The Court limited its holding by
requiring that such harassment be "so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive
that it effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or
benefit."' 25 The Court concluded that a fifth-grade girl's repeated endurance of
verbal harassment and "numerous acts of objectively offensive touching"' 126 by a
male classmate and her subsequent poor grades and depression could satisfy that
standard. The Court further limited liability to only situations where the recipient of
federal funds exercised "substantial control over both the harasser and the context
in which the known harassment occurs."' 27 Harassment occurring during school
hours on school grounds satisfied the requirement of control over the context.
Thus, the elements for a student-on-student sexual harassment case require (1)
school officials to have actual notice of sexual harassment; (2) the harassment to be
so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the
victim of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school;
and (3) that school officials respond with deliberate indifference to the known
harassment. This high burden of proof demonstrates how reluctant the Court was to
hold public schools liable for the acts of third-party students.
1. Supreme Court Insight into the Severe and Pervasive Standard
The Supreme Court has issued some guidance on what types of sexual harassment
would rise to the level of severe and pervasive. The examples the Court has

121. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
122. The relevant section of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 reads, "No person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)
(2001).
123. Justice O'Connor authored the opinion of the Court, which Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and

Breyer joined. Justice Kennedy filed a dissent, which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas
joined.

124. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 653.
127. Id. at 645.
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28
presented demonstrate the high burden of proof required of a harassment victim.1
The Davis opinion acknowledged that "overt, physical deprivation of access to
school resources" 129 would be the behavior most likely to give rise to damages. To
define what behavior would indicate physical exclusion, the Court gave the example
of male students repeatedly issuing physical threats that prevented female students
from accessing school facilities. 130 The Court qualified this by noting that showing
overt physical deprivation of education benefits was not necessary, only that
educational opportunities had been deprived on the basis of sex.' 3
In further determining what level of "gender-oriented conduct"' 3 2 would be
actionable, the Court instructed that a number of factors should be considered. The
Court was particularly concerned that lower courts allow for the immaturity of
students, emphasizing that "unlike the adult workplace... children may regularly
interact in a manner that would be unacceptable among adults."' 33 The Court then
gave several specific examples of immature behavior that would not give rise to
liability: "insults, banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and.. .name-calling[,]... even
where these comments target differences in gender."'" Finally, observing the intent
of Congress in enacting Title IX"3'5 and acknowledging concerns over excessive
that a single incident of sexual harassment would
litigation, the Court indicated
36
likely not trigger damages. 1
Curiously, the Davis Court cited Tinker for the proposition that school officials
have enough control over students to be held liable for student-on-student
harassment. '37 Such reliance is ironic given that the overall Tinker holding limited
the authority of school administrators to control student speech. 38 Further, the
opinion mentions neither Frasernor Hazelwood, two post-Tinker cases that placed
' Though
much greater authority in the hands of school officials to control students. 39
there are no express references to student speech, the examples tested for severity
by the Court imply that threatening speech 40 is distinguishable from "simple acts

128. Id. at 652. In response to the dissent, the majority specifically highlighted the "very real limitations" the
opinion places upon liability. Id.
129. Id. at 650.
130. Id. at650-51.
131. Id. at 651.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 651-52.
135. Id. at 653 ("By limiting private damages actions to cases having a systemic effect on educational
programs or activities, we reconcile the general principle that Title IX prohibits official indifference to known peer
harassment with the practical realities of responding to student behavior, realities that Congress could not have
meant to be ignored.").
136. Id. at 652-53.
137. Id.at 646 ("On more than one occasion, this Court has recognized the importance of school officials'
'comprehensive authority..., consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct
in the schools."' (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507)).
138. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
139. See Fraser,478 U.S. at 686; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.4. Both opinions cite Just,ce Black's
dissenting opinion in Tinker as particularly relevant: "I wish therefore,.. to disclaim any purpose.. to hold that the
Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control of the American
public school system to public school students." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting).
140. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.
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of teasing,"'' and that threats are much more likely to satisfy the severe and
pervasive requirement than does teasing. 142 As explored above, the First Amendment
does not protect truly threatening speech in any setting.
2. Lower Court Interpretations of the Severe and Pervasive Standard
Since the Davis ruling in May of 1999, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits have
addressed peer sexual harassment.'43 In each of these cases, the courts found
harassment that rose to the level of severe and pervasive. However, the facts in each
of the situations were obviously extreme; so they provide limited guidance to
resolving difficult cases. Two of the cases included allegations of sexual assaults,'"
facts that the courts concluded clearly met the Davis standard.145 The third case
involved conduct that was less serious, but at least on a par with that analyzed in
Davis.'" The female victim endured both physical and verbal attacks.'47 She was
stabbed in the hand with a pen, 148 held down by two students while others attempted
to disrobe her, 149 fondled and propositioned,' and subjected to vulgar language. 5'
Along with Davis, these cases are consistently cited by lower courts analyzing the
severe and pervasive standard. Given the egregious conduct presented in this
precedent, there is little wonder that lower courts have required relatively extreme
behavior to satisfy the severe and pervasive standard.
Of the federal district courts that have analyzed the severe and pervasive standard
established in Davis, none has yet found that verbal harassment alone satisfies the
standard. 52 Two courts have even found that significant physical harassment in
conjunction with harassing speech fell short of the severe and pervasive standard
when only a single instance of "sexual" contact was alleged. 53 Other courts

141. Id.at 652.
142. Id. at 650-52.
143. See Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 1999); Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch., 231 F.3d 253
(6th Cir. 2000); Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Co., 183 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999).
144. Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1248; Soper, 195 F.3d at 855.
145. Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1248; Soper, 195 F.3d at 855.
146. Vance, 231 F.3d at 259.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 256.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 257.
151. Id. at 256.
152. See generally Doe v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 2002 WL 1592694 (N.D. Tex. 2002); Johnson v. Ind. Sch.
Dist. No. 47, 194 F. Supp. 2d 939 (D. Minn. 2002); Burwell v. Pekin Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 303, 213 F. Supp. 2d
917 (C.D. II1. 2002); Benjamin v. Metro. Sch. Dist. of Lawrence Township, 2002 WL 977661 (S.D. Ind. 2002);
Manfredi v. Mount Vernon Bd. of Ed., 94 F. Supp. 2d 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Wilson v. Beaumont Ind. Sch. Dist.,
144 F. Supp. 2d 690 (E.D. Tex. 2001); Kay P. Kindred, When Equal Opportunity Meets Freedom of Expression:
Student-on-Student Sexual Harassmentand the FirstAmendment in School, 75 N.D. L. REV. 205, 222 n. 116 (1999)
("[T]hose cases of student-on-student harassment that have reached the courts have included some physical touching
or other conduct in addition to harassing speech.").
153. See Manfredi, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 454-55 ("Teasing, kicking, shoving and pokes in the face are annoying
and hurtful to any child who is victimized by them. Such behavior may even leave a child quite traumatized and
upset. But in Davis Justice O'Connor went to great pains to make clear that such conduct-even if perpetrated by
a child of one gender against a child of another gender-is not actionable as 'sexual' harassment."). This court does
not reach the issue of whether one additional instance of "sexual" groping would satisfy the standard because the
victim only missed one day of school and thus was not denied access to education. See also Wilson, 144 F. Supp.
2d at 695 ("Even assuming that Wilson was sexually assaulted [one time] the facts of this case do not meet the
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examining exclusively verbal harassment have in part dismissed the cases
specifically for a lack of physical conduct.'54 The most extreme example of verbal
harassment that was held insufficient to satisfy the severe and pervasive standard
involved daily endurance of epitaphs such as "bitch, pussy, and slut""' by a group
of male students known as "Men Over Bitches."' 15 6 In addition, the verbal harassment escalated to threats of rape 57 and physical assault or death.' 58 Though the
harassing students were arrested 159 for their behavior, the court still found that the
facts did not support a finding of "severe, pervasive and objectively offensive
harassment based upon sex."'" This survey of cases demonstrates that the lower
courts have interpreted the severe and pervasive standard to require extreme
behavior that must include some physical conduct beyond verbal harassment.
B. Lower CourtApplication of Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment
Jurisprudencein Same-Sex HarassmentContexts
Because the Saxe 16' and Henkle'62 complaints concerned same-sex harassment or
harassment on the basis of sexual orientation, it is important to also examine how
federal courts have applied Title IX in that context. In addition, lesbian, gay,
bisexual, or transgender (LGBT) youth represent a population particularly vulnerable to student-on-student harassment in the public school system. A recent national
survey found that among LGBT students,
83% personally had been verbally harassed at school (that is, called names or
threatened) because of their sexual orientation; 65% had been sexually harassed
(e.g. inappropriately touched or subjected to sexual comments); 42% had been
physically harassed (by being shoved or pushed) and 21% had been assaulted
(by being punched, kicked or injured with a weapon) at school because of their
and 62% felt unsafe in their school because of their sexual
sexual orientation;
63
orientation. 1

standard set in Davis."). The Wilson court discounted "evidence of prior bullying, teasing, and name-calling"
because it was not "gender-related harassment." Id. at 694. A third court has reached the contrary conclusion that
a single instance of sexual assault could rise to the level of severe and pervasive harassment. But see Dallas Ind.
Sch. Dist., 2002 WL 1592694, at *6 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 652-53) ("[Olne single instance of a forced manual
penetration of one's vagina seems to qualify as a 'sufficiently severe one-on-one peer harassment."').
154. See Johnson, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 946 ("[The harassed student] identified two male students who teased
her about playing the flute and using it in a sexual manner, but there is no evidence suggesting they made any
physical contact. She in fact has offered no evidence of any offensive physical touching."); Benjamin, 2002 WL
977661, at *5 ("[The victim] was not inappropriately touched or subjected to any harassment of a physical nature.");
Burwell, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 930 ("It is undisputed that all of the conduct reported by Plaintiff was verbal, not
physical. Plaintiff was not touched in any way by any of the male students she has accused of sexual harassment.
The cases where student-on-student sexual harassment, in violation of Title IX, was found to exist involved much
more egregious conduct than was reported in this case.").
155. Burwell, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 930.
156. Id. at 919. The group was alternatively called "Money Over Bitches." Id.
157. Id. at 931. The court found the fact that the threats were not made in the plaintiff's immediate presence
determinative. Id.
158. Jd. at 926.
159. Id.at 920.
160. Id. at 931.
161. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 203.
162. Henkle, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1069.
163. Lambda Legal, Facts: Gay and Lesbian Youth in Schools, (Aug. 28, 2002), at http://www.lambdalegal
.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record= 1120 (last visited Mar. 9, 2003) (citing Office of Public Policy of the
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The survey further indicated that the same student population was subjected to
verbal taunts such as "faggot" or "dyke" frequently with little or no
faculty or staff
intervention.' 6 Finally, the law in this area has only recently emerged
within the
federal court system.
While at this time no circuit courts have addressed the issue, several
district
courts have found that Title IX applies to same-sex harassment. Courts
that have
addressed the issue engage in an additional level of analysis, borrowing
concepts
from cases evaluating sexual harassment in the employment context. 6 1
In Montgomery v. Independent School DistrictNo. 709, the court engaged
particularly complex analysis to reach the conclusion that student harassment in a
based
on sexual orientation could state a claim under Title IX 166 There the court
first ruled
that Title IX only covers discrimination "based on sex"' 167 and does
not extend to
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 68 The court, however, went
on to hold
that a student could state a claim under Title IX if there were sufficient
facts to
demonstrate the same-sex harassment had been motivated by "a
failure
to
meet
expected gender stereotypes."' 169 To reach this conclusion, the court first
established
that Title VII' 70 cases could be consulted to interpret Title IX
definitions of
discrimination because of sex.' 7 1 The court then cited to Oncale
v.
Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc., 72 in which the Supreme Court ruled that "claims
based on
same-sex harassment are cognizable under Title VII.' ' 73 The next step
relied on the
holdings in two Title VII cases: Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe,
Inc. 74 and

Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education Network (GLSEN), National
School
http://www.glsen.org/binary-data/GLSENARTICLES/pdf-file/1307.pdf Climate Survey (2001), available at
(last
visited
May 15, 2003)(Nine hundred
four LGBT students from forty-eight states and the District of Columbia
were sampled for this survey.))
164. Eighty-two percent of the targeted students "reported that faculty
or staff never or only sometimes
intervened when they were present when such remarks were made."
Id.
165. See Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165,
1169 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Montgomery v.
Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1089-92 (D. Minn. 2000);
Snelling v. Fall Mountain Reg'l Sch. Dist.,
2001 WL 276975, 4 (D.N.H. 2001). The Seventh Circuit has held that
a student may state a claim for student-onstudent sexual harassment under an equal protection claim based on
gender and sexual orientation. Nabozny v.
Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446,453-58 (7th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit recently
ruled, in a similar equal protection claim,
that the "right to be free from intentional discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation was clearly established."
Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir.
2003). In Flores, the court denied school
administrators a qualified immunity defense in an anti-homosexual student-on-student
harassment case. Id.
166. Montgomery, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1089-92. The other two federal
court opinions that address this issue
use similar reasoning but skip several steps. In Ray, after acknowledging
that the Supreme Court had recognized
a Title VII claim for same-sex harassment, the court simply concluded
that harassment on the basis of "perceived
sexual status as a homosexual," 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1170, could be inferred
to be on the basis of sex. The Snelling
court simply adopted the reasoning in Higgins v. New Balance Athletic
Shoes, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir.
1999). Snelling, 2001 WL 276975, 4.
167. Montgomery, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1090.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1091.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2001). Title VII prohibits an employer
from discriminating on the basis of sex.
Id.
171. Montgomery, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1091 ("[T]he Supreme Court
relied upon Title VII precedents in first
recognizing a private cause of action for sexual harassment under Title
IX." (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74 (1992))).
172. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
173. Montgomery, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1091 (citing Oncale, 523 U.S.
at 79).
174. 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (Ist Cir. 1999).
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Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.175The court demonstrated that the Supreme Court had
"already determined that discrimination based on a claimant's failure to satisfy the
stereotypes associated with his or her sex constitutes discrimination 'because of sex'
within the meaning of Title VII."

6

From this reasoning, the Montgomery court

concluded that a student could state a claim under Title IX by pleading facts
177 that
indicated the harassment was due to an inability to meet gender stereotypes.
In applying the Title IX severe and pervasive standard, the federal courts
addressing student harassment in the same-sex context appear to uphold the same
strict requirements used by courts in the opposite-sex situations explored above.
Each of the same-sex harassment cases holding that the harassment was severe and
pervasive enough involved some level of physical abuse.' 78 Significantly, in each of
escalated from verbal abuse that school officials failed
the cases, the mistreatment
79
to adequately remedy. 1

III. FEDERAL OPINIONS EXAMINING BOTH STANDARDS
Saxe v. State College Area School District8 ° and Henkle v. Gregory 8' are the
only two federal cases to date that address public school freedom of speech and
sexual harassment issues in the same opinion. Of the two, only Saxe addressed the
standards in relationship with one another. In Henkle, the school district faced
possible liability for both freedom of speech and sexual harassment violations but
did not analyze how the standards might intersect.
A. Anti-HarassmentPolicy Struck Down as UnconstitutionallyOverbroad
In Saxe, the Third Circuit held that the school district's anti-harassment policy
was unconstitutionally overbroad. 182Two Christian students and their father initiated
the suit. 8 3 They alleged that the policy violated their free speech rights to "speak out
about the sinful nature and harmful effects of homosexuality."' 84 The Middle
District Court of Pennsylvania dismissed the suit with a determination that

175. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
176. Montgomery, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1092.
177. Id.

178. See Ray, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1165 ("Defendant...allegedly struck Plaintiffs head causing a concussion,
hearing impairment in one ear, severe and permanent headaches, and severe psychological injury."); Montgomery,

109 F. Supp. 2d at 1081 ("According to plaintiff, the students' misconduct escalated to the point of physical
violence beginning in the sixth grade, when several students punched him, kicked him, and knocked him down on
the playground."); Snelling, 2001 WL 276975, 3 ("The verbal and physical abuse continued for the remainder of
the boys' high school experiences.").
179. See Ray, 107 F. Supp. at 1167 (Prior to the most severe physical assault, "Plaintiff alleges that [the
school's] agents and employees took no action to curtail the harassing conduct."); Montgomery, 109 F. Supp. 2d
at 1086 ("With the exception of one occasion, defendant has not shown that any of the students whom teachers sent

to the principal's office in response to plaintiffs reports ever received discipline stronger than a verbal reprimand.");
Snelling, 2001 WL 276975, 2 ("In response to Derek's concerns about name-calling, [the principal] explained to
The coaches continued to ignore the
Derek that peers can be mean in high school, which is a part of growing up...
verbal and physical harassment.").
180. 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
181. 150 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (D. Nev. 2001).
182. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 214.
183. Id. at 203.
184. Id.
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"'harassment,' as defined by federal and state anti-discrimination statutes, is not
entitled to First Amendment protection."' 85 The lower court concluded that the
policy was no more restrictive than federal and state law and was therefore
constitutional. In overturning the district court, though, the Third Circuit found that
there was no "categorical
'harassment exception' to the First Amendment's free
186
speech clause."'

1. No Categorical Exception for Harassing Speech
In concluding that the district court had erred in finding a blanket harassment
exception to the First Amendment, the Third Circuit consulted two lines of
authority: Title VII and Title IX "hostile environment" harassment cases187 and
content- or viewpoint-based First Amendment cases.' 88 Citing Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education,189 the court acknowledged that schools could be held
liable to private actions for student-on-student harassment.190
The heart of the opinion, however, placed great emphasis on R.A. V. v. City of St.
Paul,'9' a case testing the validity of a municipal hate-speech ordinance. 92 In
examining R.A. V., the Third Circuit conceded, "government may constitutionally
prohibit speech whose non-expressive qualities promote discrimination. "' The Saxe
court noted several examples that would qualify under such a rule, such as a
supervisor saying, "sleep with me or you're fired,"" or a robber demanding, "your
money or your life."' 95 The Third Circuit, however, ultimately determined that
R.A. V. did not stand for the proposition that "anti-discrimination laws are
categorically immune from First Amendment challenge when they are applied to
prohibit speech solely on the basis of its expressive content."' 96 In reaching this
determination, the court emphasized that "'[h]arassing' or discriminatory speech,
although evil and offensive, may be used to communicate ideas or emotions that
nevertheless implicate First Amendment protections."' 97
Based primarily on the RA.V. analysis, the Third Circuit was particularly
troubled with the State College Area School District (SCASD) policy prohibition
of "harassment based on personal characteristics that are not protected under federal
law."' 98 The court concluded that federal law extends only to harassment based on
"sex, race, color, national origin, age and disability,"' 99 whereas the SCASD policy
included personal characteristics such as "clothing," "appearance," "hobbies and

185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 204.
Id.
Id. at 205-06.
ld. at 206-10.

189. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
190. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 205.

191. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
192. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 207 (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377).
193. Id. at 208.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id. at 210.
Id.
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values."2 °° Particularly offensive to the court was the policy's prohibition of speech
about "values. '2 ' The court emphasized that such a restriction "strikes at the heart
of moral and political discourse-the lifeblood of constitutional self government
(and democratic education) and the core concern of the First Amendment. ' 20 2 Thus,
the Third Circuit held that the district court erred in determining that the SCASD
policy merely mirrored federal and state harassment laws.20 3
2. Third Circuit Interpretation of the Free Speech Case Law
After establishing this error, the court turned to the line of Supreme Court
precedent addressing free speech within the public school context. The court cited
Tinker for the proposition that "regulation of student speech is generally permissible
only when the speech would substantially disrupt or interfere with the work of the
school or the rights of other students. ' '2°4 Examining the application of the Tinker
rule by other federal courts, the court noted that the wearing of "SCAB" buttons,0 5
the wearing of a rosary, 20 6 and the distribution of religious tracts 2 7 were all protected
forms of First Amendment expression under the Tinker rationale. The court also
cited West v. Darby Unified School DistrictNo. 260, which held a school could
discipline a student for drawing a Confederate flag. 208 The Third Circuit pointed out
that although the West court reached a contrary result, it confirmed the Tinker
rule. 2 9 The West court carefully documented a history of racial tensions at the
school. Because of this history, administrators were able to demonstrate that the
drawing created a "concrete threat of substantial disruption, 20 and it was thus
within their power under Tinker to suppress the speech.
The Third Circuit treated Fraserand Hazelwood as "narrow categories of speech
that a school may restrict even without the threat of substantial disruption."2'' Citing
Fraser,the court acknowledged that schools may "prohibit words that 'offend for
the same reasons that obscenity offends.' ' 2 12 In analyzing the Hazelwood exception
for school-sponsored speech, the court examined two other post-Hazelwood
decisions. The Third Circuit cited Rosenbergerv. Rector & Visitors of University

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. One commentator is especially critical of the Saxe court's reliance on RA.V. in reaching this
determination because the opinion does not come from the line of cases addressing freedom of speech in public
schools. See Martha McCarthy, Anti-Harassment Policies in Public Schools: How Vulnerable Are They?, 31 J.L.
& EDUC. 52, 64-67 (2002). Another commentator praises the Third Circuit and other courts for beginning to apply
the "larger First Amendment doctrine" to the public school setting. Contra Pyle, supra note 86, at 626-28 (2002).
204. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 211.
205. Id. (citing Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992)). In Chandler,the school
punished students for wearing "SCAB" buttons in support of a teacher strike at their school. Id.
206. Id. (citing Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 2d 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997)). The school
prohibited rosaries under a ban on gang-related apparel after some gangs began using the rosary as their mark. Id.
at 211-12.
207. ld. at 212 (citing Clark v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 806 F. Supp. 2d 116, 120 (N.D. Tex. 1992)).
208. West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000).
209. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 212.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 213 (quoting Fraser,478 U.S. at 685).
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of Virginia2 as a clarification of the "legitimate pedagogical concern" test. The
court noted that Hazelwood controls only when "a student's school-sponsored
speech could reasonably be viewed as speech of the school itself. '2 4 In addition, the
court examined a Seventh Circuit case that held a school could not prohibit students
from "distributing religious materials on school grounds. 215 The court accepted the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning that in instances where recipients could confuse the
school as the sponsor, "'[t]he school's proper response is to educate the audience
rather than squelch the speaker.' 216 Thus the Third Circuit adopted an especially
narrow interpretation of Hazelwood, which significantly limits a school's ability to
curtail student distribution of written literature.
3. The SCASD Policy Held Unconstitutionally Overbroad
In finding the SCASD policy overbroad, the Third Circuit relied principally on
the Tinker substantial disruption test,217 though it noted that the policy prohibited
significantly more speech than could be restricted under the "relatively more
permissive Fraseror Hazelwood standards. 2 8 Of particular concern to the court
was the policy's definition of harassment: "any unwelcome verbal, written or
physical conduct which offends, denigrates or belittles an individual because of any
of the characteristics described above., 2, "9 The court determined that some of this
definition was facially overbroad, based on a series of Supreme Court rulings
holding that "the mere fact that someone might take offense at the content of speech
'
is not sufficient justification for prohibiting it."220
The court further determined that there was no "reasonable limiting construction"
that could save the SCASD policy. 22' Applying the narrowest reading, the court
concluded that the policy would restrict speech that had "the purpose or effect of
either substantially interfering with a student's educational performance or creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment. 222 While the court acknowledged
that the text referring to substantial interference with a student's educational
performance mirrored the Tinker standard, they held that both the "purpose"
component and the "creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment"
criterion were constitutionally problematic. Limiting speech used with the purpose
to be disruptive was far broader than the Tinker standard "that a school must
reasonably believe that speech will cause actual, material disruption before
prohibiting it. '"223 The court also determined that the "hostile environment" prong
could encompass "any speech about some enumerated personal characteristics the
content of which offends someone," which could "include much 'core' political and

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

515 U.S. 819 (1995).
Saxe, 240 F.3d at 213-14.
Id. at 214 (citing Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1295).
Id. at 214 (quoting Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1299).
Id. at 217-18.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 215.
Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).
Id.
Id.
at 217.
Id.
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religious speech. 224 Since much of this speech would "not pose a realistic threat of
substantial disruption," such restrictions violated First Amendment protections
based on the Tinker rule.225 The Third Circuit concluded that the SCASD had a
compelling state interest to "maintain an orderly and non-disruptive educational
environment," but ultimately concluded that the policy restrictions were too broad
226
to pass constitutional muster.
In summary, according to Saxe, there is no categorical exception for harassing
speech under the First Amendment because such an exception could suppress speech
with expressive content.227 The court reasoned that regulating the content of speech
violated the fundamental principle that "'government may not prohibit the expres22
sion of an idea simply because society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable.' 1
Using a categorical scheme to interpret the Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwoodtrilogy, the
Third Circuit further determined that the SCASD policy was subject to the Tinker
substantial disruption analysis. Under this framework, the court concluded that the
SCASD policy was too broad because it covered "substantially more speech than
could be prohibited under Tinker's substantial disruption test., 229 An important
observation of this holding is that the Third Circuit did not find any flaw with the
SCASD extending protection to cover harassment based on sexual orientation. This
appeared to be the thrust of the challenge, and yet nowhere in the opinion does the
court attack or even question the inclusion of sexual orientation in the list of
protected categories.
B. Students Have a ConstitutionalRight to Disclose Their Sexuality at School
On February 28, 2002, the U.S. District Court of Nevada became the first U.S.
federal court to acknowledge that gay students may have a constitutional right to
disclose their sexuality at school.23 ° The decision came in response to a motion by
the defense to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.23 1 Henkle's complaint alleged that while attending Galena High School he
had "endured constant harassment, assaults, intimidation, and discrimination by
other students because he is gay and male. 232 In addition, after receiving notice of
the incessant harassment, school officials "failed to take any action. '233 A teacher
at the high school who allegedly knew of the harassment told Henkle that "his
sexuality was a private matter that should be kept to himself., 234 Fearing continued
harassment and assaults, Henkle requested a transfer to a different school in the

224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 209.
228. Id. (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
229. Id. at 217.
230. Henkle, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
231. Id. at 1071. At this procedural juncture, "all material allegations in the complaint are accepted as true
and are to be construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. (citing Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996)).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1070.
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district. A school administrator
agreed to the transfer on the condition "that he keep
235
his sexuality to himself.,
Following the transfer, the principal at the new school told Henkle several times
"to keep quiet about his 23sexual
orientation and during one meeting.. .told him to
'stop acting like a fag."' 6 Despite his relative safety at the second high school,
Henkle requested another transfer for academic reasons.237 Although the principal
initially told him that "the transfer was not possible because [he] was openly gay and
a traditional high school would not be appropriate, ' 23 Henkle was transferred
to a
239
third high school and was again told "to keep his sexuality to himself.
The harassment and intimidation resumed at the third high school. School police
allegedly observed Henkle being punched in the face by one student while others
shouted gay epithets. The officers did nothing to discourage the attack, refused to
arrest anyone, and later discouraged Henkle from "calling the assault a hate crime
and from reporting it to the Reno Police Department." 240 Following this episode,
school administrators enrolled Henkle in a program at the Truckee Meadows
Community College. Because Henkle was no longer attending public high school,
he was no longer eligible for a high school diploma.
Based on these facts, the district court held that Henkle had established a claim
that his First Amendment rights had been violated. The allegations sufficiently
supported two theories: (1) the school district had suppressed First Amendment
rights, and (2) the school had retaliated when Henkle exercised those rights. In
allowing the first claim to go forward, the court relied exclusively on the Tinker
standard. Although the court acknowledged that the school administrators "might
reasonably have believed such disruption or interference would likely occur,' 2 4 , it
could not say on their face "that these instances substantially or materially interfered
with school activities. 242 Thus, according to this court, disclosure of a minority
sexual orientation by a student at school is not inherently disruptive speech and is
thus protected under the First Amendment.
With respect to the retaliation claim, the court outlined a three-part inquiry. First,
the plaintiff must prove "(1) the speech at issue was constitutionally protected; and
(2) the speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse action."243 If
those two requirements are satisfied, the defendants must (3) "demonstrate they
would have taken the same actions against [the] plaintiff, even in absence of his
protected conduct."' 2" The court found that the prior ruling on the protection issue
satisfied the first prong. As for the second prong, the court emphasized that the

235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. Henkle was a gifted and talented student and had been placed in a school for alternative education.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1075.
242. Id.
243. Id. (citing Moran v. Washington, 147 F.3d 839, 846 (9th Cir. 1998); Brewster v. Bd. of Educ., 149 F.3d
971, 978 (9th Cir. 1998)).
244. Id.
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failure to discipline the harassers,245 the repeated transfers conditioned on "the fact
that he keep his sexuality to himself,"246 the placement of a gifted and talented
student in an alternative education program,247 and the administrator's opinion that
an openly gay student could not appropriately be placed in a traditional high school
' Therefore,
could be inferred as "retaliatory in nature."248
the court held that Henkle
had satisfied his burden in stating a First Amendment retaliation claim.
Based on the same facts, the court also held that the harassment Henkle endured
may have been severe enough to warrant punitive damages.249 For this decision, the
court relied on the controlling case from the Ninth Circuit, Reese v. Jefferson School
25 ° Under
District.
the Davis framework, the Reese decision established a four-part
test for student-on-student sexual harassment liability.25 For this determination, the
court focused on the fourth requirement: "the school district's 'deliberate
indifference subjects its students to harassment.""'25 A prior Ninth Circuit case had
defined deliberate indifference as "'the conscious or reckless disregard of the
consequences of ones acts or omissions."'253 Relying on other Ninth Circuit
precedent, the court found that reckless or callous disregard of or indifference to the
' In light
rights of others was "sufficient to sustain an award of punitive damages."254
of these facts and the precedent, the court concluded that punitive damages could be
warranted.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FREE SPEECH AND SEXUAL
HARASSMENT STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SETTING
One commentator has suggested three possibilities for how the standards for free
speech and sexual harassment might interrelate: (A) there is a discrete point at which
First Amendment protections end and impermissible harassment begins; (B) there
is a gap between the two standards where school officials may suppress speech that
falls short of harassment and still avoid liability for First Amendment violations; or
(C) the two standards overlap, leaving schools helpless to regulate expression that

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
id. at 1078.
Id. at 1077-78. The court lays out the Title IX test as follows:
(I) the school district "must exercise substantial control over both the harasser and the context
in which the known harassment occurs," (2) the plaintiff must suffer "sexual harassment.. that
is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of
access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school," (3) the school district
must have "actual knowledge of the harassment," and (4) the school district's "deliberate
indifference subjects its students to harassment."
Id. (citing Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736,739 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 645,
650)).
251. Henkle, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1078. Significantly, the defendants only challenged the availability of
punitive damages under Title IX, not the claim in general. Id. at 1071 n.4.
252. Id. (quoting Reese, 208 F.3d at 739). The court did not analyze the first three elements of the Title IX
claim because the overall claim of Title IX liability was not included in the motion to dismiss. Only the fourth
element was materially relevant to the narrow issue of punitive damages.
253. Id. (quoting Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1991)).
254. Id. (citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983)).
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is both protected by the First Amendment and triggers liability under Title IX.255 See
Figure 1.
FIGURE 1

Model A: There is a discrete point at which First Amendment protections end and
impermissible harassment begins.

I

protected speech

speech triggering harassment liability

In this model, the point in the middle represents where protected speech would
become harassing speech. Under this system, school administrators would have to
walk that fine line to avoid First Amendment violations and still protect the school
from sexual harassment liability.
Model B: There is a gap between the two standards where school officials may
suppress speech that falls short of harassment and still avoid liability for First
Amendment violations.
protected speech I regulatoryflexibility I speech triggering harassment liability
In this model, the gap in the middle represents a category of speech that does not rise
to the level of harassment, but may be suppressed without offending the First
Amendment. This scheme is the most flexible for the school administration, the safest
for potential harassment victims, but the most restrictive on free speech.
Model C: The two standards overlap, leaving schools helpless to regulate expression
that is both protected by the First Amendment and triggers liability under Title IX.
protected speech

overlap

speech triggering harassment liability

This model places school administrators in the impossible position of not being able
to control student speech that would trigger Title IX liability for student-on-student
harassment.
Of the three possibilities, the overlapping standards scenario (Model C) is the
least workable and was not likely contemplated when the Supreme Court created a
private action for student-on-student sexual harassment. Given the effort the Davis
majority took to limit school liability, it is irrational to conclude that the Court
intended to create a situation where schools could not shield against Title IX actions
without offending the First Amendment.256 Though the dissent in Davis raised
concerns that "[o]n college campuses, and even in secondary schools, a student's
claim that the school should remedy a sexually hostile environment will conflict

255. Thomas R. Baker, Tinkering with Tinker: The Third Circuit's Overbreadth Test for School AntiHarassmentCodes, 164 EDUc. L REP. 2 (2002).
256. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648-53.
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with the alleged harasser's claim that his speech, even if offensive, is protected by
the First Amendment," '57 the majority did not directly consider any consequences
the ruling might have on student free-speech issues. Indirectly, however, the
majority explained that the deliberately indifferent standard afforded school
administrators ample flexibility258 and clarified that "it would be entirely reasonable
for a school to refrain from a form of disciplinary action that would expose it to
constitutional or statutory claims., 259 Thus, Davis does not stand for the proposition
that schools may simultaneously be held liable for Title X and First Amendment
violations.
The suggestion that protected speech leaves off where harassment begins (Model
A) is also not a realistic description of the current legal landscape. The survey of
lower court interpretations of the Davis severe and pervasive standard indicates that
speech alone cannot trigger Title IX liability. 260 Thus far, courts have required
significant physical conduct to find sufficient sexual harassment and in some
instances have specifically dismissed claims because they involved only verbal
harassment.2 Further, much of the harassing speech identified in those cases likely
falls within the regulatory power of the schools, even given the confusion over
which standard
might apply. For instance, words like "bitch, pussy, slut" 6 ' and
'
"whore"263
likely fall under Fraser'sprohibition against lewd and vulgar speech.
Words used in same-sex harassment cases such as "faggot, fag, gay boy, bitch,
homo and queer ' 2 4 probably fall under this rubric as well. In addition, threats of
rape or death265 are not protected under the First Amendment and thus would be
subject to school regulation.266
Precedent clearly indicates school officials are authorized to limit student speech
that falls short of triggering sexual harassment liability. Therefore, Model B
appropriately depicts the current legal landscape regarding the relationship of these
standards within the public school setting. The case law also suggests that the gap
between the standards may be quite wide, considering that no court has yet held that
speech alone triggers Title IX harassment and that one appeals court has gone so far
as to interpret Fraserand Hazelwood broadly enough to allow a limit on speech that
is "insulting to any group or individuals.2 67 The Seventh Circuit, however, is the
only appeals court to apply the less restrictive reasonableness test to a speech or
harassment policy, and then only in the context of elementary school students. Other
circuit courts addressing sexual or racial harassment policies have uniformly applied
the stricter substantial disruption test from Tinker.268 Even under this stricter

257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 682-83.
Id. at 648.
Id. at 649.
See supra parts IH.A.2. and ll.B.

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

See supra note 154.
Burwell, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 930.
Benjamin, 2002 WL 977661, 3.
Montgomery, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1084.
Burwell, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 927-28.

266. See supra part I.C.
267. Muller, 98 F.3d at 1534 (holding that if a school has reserved a nonpublic forum, "school officials may
impose reasonable restrictionson the speech of students, teachers, and other members of the school community").

268. See Saxe, 240 F.3d at 216 ("In short, the Policy even narrowly read, prohibits a substantial amount of
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standard though, school officials have the authority to regulate student speech that
is substantially disruptive to the school environment or impinges on the rights of
others. As pointed out by one commentator, "true harassment is disruptive,"269 and
thus could be restricted under Tinker without violating the First Amendment.
V. ANTI-HARASSMENT POLICIES AND IMPLEMENTATION
Given that no court has yet held that speech alone can rise to the level of
actionable peer harassment and because of First Amendment liability risks, school
administrators may be tempted to forego implementing anti-harassment policies that
restrict speech. Both for practical and legal reasons, such a strategy is ill-advised. 27 °
First, Title IX case law and commentators indicate that harassing speech often
escalates to physical violence.27 1 The Davis standard establishes that schools may
not be deliberately indifferent to a peer harassment problem. Thus, a student may
be able to state a Title IX claim with a single physical attack if a series of reported
verbal attacks remained unaddressed by school officials.
Second, the free-speech case law itself observes the duty a school has in
maintaining a non-disruptive and civil learning environment. In Fraser,the Supreme
Court of the United States quoted two historians to describe the "role and purpose
of the American public school system., 272 The Court stressed that "'[p]ublic
education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic .... It must inculcate the
habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and
as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the
nation.' "273
Third, a 2001 survey of 2064 public school students indicated that sexual
harassment is a widespread and pervasive problem, with eight out of ten students
(eighty-one percent) experiencing "some form of sexual harassment during their

non-vulgar, non-sponsored student speech. SCASD must therefore satisfy the Tinker test by showing that the
Policy's restrictions are necessary to prevent substantial disruption or interference with the work of the school or
the rights of other students."); Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 264 ("Thus, in this case, a particular form of harassment or
intimidation can be regulated by defendants only if it meets the requirements of Tinker; that is, if the speech at issue
gives rise to a well-founded fear of disruption or interference with the rights of others."); Castorina,246 F.3d at 540
("This case is governed by the Supreme Court's landmark decision concerning student speech, Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent School District."); West, 206 F.3d at 1366 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509) ("Thus, where school
authorities reasonably believe that a student's uncontrolled exercise of expression might 'substantially interfere with
the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students,'... they may forbid such expression.").

269. Pyle, supra note 86, at 630.
270. See Baker, supra note 255, at 539.
School officials would be well advised not to view the Supreme Court as a white knight. The
high court is not likely to resolve the multitude of complex legal questions associated with

student peer harassment. The difficult tasks of drafting the rules and enforcing the rules fairly
will always be difficult. Even a timely decision by the Supreme Court to reject the use of the
overbreadth doctrine in the educational setting would simplify the task of designing student
policies only moderately. Instead of waiting for a Supreme Court ruling, school officials should
proceed to re-evaluate existing anti-harassment policies while carefully resolving individual
complaints of harassment.
Id.
271. See supra parts I.A.2 and II.B; see also Kindred, supra note 152, at 297.
272. Fraser,478 U.S. at 681.
273.

Id. (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
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' In addition, the survey indicated that nonphysical experiences
school lives."274
'
"appear to be among the most upsetting"275
for students.
Finally, though the Third Circuit found a particular harassment policy
unconstitutional in Saxe, nothing in that opinion suggests that schools should
completely abandon anti-harassment policies. The Saxe court merely establishes
some First Amendment limits to how broad such a policy may be. A subsequent
Third Circuit decision upheld a racial harassment policy,276 applying the limitations
expressed in Saxe. That opinion is instructive for schools seeking to draft
constitutionally sound anti-harassment policies.
In Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional Board of Education, the Third Circuit
examined the constitutional validity of the school's racial harassment policy.277 In
response to racial hostilities in the Warren Hills Schools, the school board had
researched and adopted a racial harassment policy that read as follows:

District employees and student(s) shall not racially harass or intimidate other
student(s) or employee(s) by name calling, using racial or derogatory slurs,
wearing or possession of items depicting or implying racial hatred or prejudice.
District employees and students shall not at school, on school property or at
school activities wear or have in their possession any written material, either
printed or in their own handwriting, that is racially divisive or creates ill will or
hatred.27
The facial challenge to the racial harassment policy implicated overbreadth,
vagueness, and content-based discrimination constitutional concerns. The Third
Circuit analyzed the policy under each of those standards.
The court indicated that the policy could be unconstitutionally overbroad if it was
likely to substantially restrain free expression.279 In addition, the court noted, "a
policy can be struck down only if no reasonable limiting construction is available
that would render the policy constitutional."28 ° In upholding the Warren Hills policy,
the court explained two important distinctions from the State College Area School
District (SCASD) policy at issue in Saxe. First, the court emphasized that the
language in the Warren Hills policy was sufficiently narrower than the SCASD
policy. Of more importance to the court was the history of racial hostility at the
school prior to the implementation of the policy. Relying on the Tinker standard, the
court demonstrated that "the policy was intended to address a particular and concrete
set of problems involving genuine disruption-not merely lack of mutual respect."2 8'

274. American Association of University Women Educational Foundation, Hostile Hallways: Bullying,
Teasing, and Sexual Harrassmentin School (2001), available at http://www.aauw.org/research/girls-education/
hostile.cfm (last visited July 30, 2003).
275. Id. The survey showed that students were "most likely to report that they would be very upset if someone
did the following: Spread sexual rumors about them (75 percent).... Said they were gay or lesbian (73
percent)... .Wrote sexual messages or graffiti about them on bathroom walls, in locker rooms, etc. (63 percent)."
Id.
276. Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 243.
277. Id. at 258-69.
278. Id. at 249.
279. Id. at 258.
280. Id. at 259.
281. Id.
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The bulk of the court's overbreadth analysis focused on the phrases "name
calling" and "ill will" in the policy. The court determined that the phrase "name
calling" did not refer to name-calling in general, but that it was limited to "racial
harassment or intimidation by name calling. 28 2 In holding that the name calling
provision of the policy was not facially overbroad, the court explained that "[t]here
'
is no constitutional right to be a bully"283
but cautioned that harassing or
intimidating name calling must still rise to the disruption or interference standard in
Tinker in order to be constitutionally suppressed. 2' The court ultimately held that
due to the history of racial unrest at the school, the board had reason to anticipate
that racial slurs would be disruptive and thus that part of the policy was not
constitutionally overbroad.
The "ill will" language in the policy proved more problematic. The court
determined that the phrase expanded the policy "too far into the domain of protected
expression. 285 The court ultimately upheld the policy by striking the "ill will"
language, but further cautioned that the constitutionality of the policy depended
heavily on the recent disruptions caused by racial hostility. In an explicit warning,
the court stated that "the policy would likely be unconstitutional in another school
28 6
district, or even in Warren Hills at a different time.
Fortunately, the opinion included some additional advice in drafting antiharassment policies to avoid overbreadth problems. The Third Circuit explained that
a school could avoid constitutional problems "by more directly addressing the
factors that justify the school's regulation of the speech. 2 87 Of particular
importance, the Third Circuit cited with implied approval the amended SCASD
harassment policy at issue in Saxe. The SCASD responded to the Third Circuit
decision against it by limiting the definition of harassment in reference to
disruption.288 The new SCASD policy does precisely what the Third Circuit advised
by making express references to the Supreme Court speech and harassment
standards as expressed in Tinker, Fraser,and Davis.
In examining the Warren Hills policy for vagueness, the court instructed that
regulations must give adequate notice to the speaker of the scope of the restrictions

282. Id. at 264.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 265.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 266.
288. Id. at 262 n.20. The court quoted the relevant portions of the SCASD anti-harassment policy:
The term 'harassment' as used in the Policy means verbal, written, graphic or physical conduct
which does or is reasonably believed under the totality of the circumstances to 1.substantially
or materially interfere with a student's or students' educational performance; and/or 2. deny any
student or students benefits or opportunities offered by the School District; and/or 3.
substantially disrupt school operations or activities; and/or 4. contain lewd, vulgar or profane
expression; and/or 5. create a hostile or abusive environment which is of such pervasiveness and
severity that it materially and adversely alters the condition of a student's or students'
educational environment, from both an objective viewpoint and the subjective viewpoint of the
student at whom the harassment is directed.
Id. (citing http://www.scasd.kl2.pa.us/policies/antiharassment.html (visited Aug. 7, 2002)). The policy is currently
available at http://www.scasd.org/2497-75820145914/blank/browse.asp?A=383&BMDRN=2000&BCOB=O&C=
47699.
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imposed.289 In addition, a policy must be clear enough to avoid "'arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." 29' The court's analysis began by distinguishing school
" ' "[B]ecause schools need
disciplinary rules from criminal statutes.29
the authority
to control such a wide range of disruptive behavior, 'school disciplinary rules need
not be as detailed as a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions.""292 Thus,
a school rule must be especially vague to trigger court intervention. As a result, the
court held that the racial harassment policy was "specific enough to give fair notice
to the students and to provide school officials with standards by which to enforce
'
the policy."293
In its content-discrimination analysis, the Third Circuit acknowledged the R.A. V.
rule establishing that "'[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid.' "294
The court conceded that by singling out "racially provocative expression, 2 95 the
Warren Hills policy was a content-based restriction.2 96 The opinion went on,
however, to emphasize that "the public school setting is fundamentally different
from other contexts. 297 Principally relying on Tinker, the court concluded that the
policy struck the proper balance required by a First Amendment analysis in the
public school setting.2 98 The Third Circuit held that under these circumstances,
where the school could demonstrate a recent history of racial hostility, it could
constitutionally restrict certain expression because of "a well-founded fear of
disruption."2 99

CONCLUSION
The primary lesson from Sypniewski is that it is possible to draft an antiharassment policy that passes constitutional muster by not being overbroad, vague,
or overly content-discriminatory. This case indicates that the key for school
administrators is to specifically reference the authority to restrict speech already
outlined by the Supreme Court of the United States in Tinker, Fraser, and
Hazelwood. This structure allows school officials sufficient authority to restrict
harassing speech that would cause disruption or interference with other students.
Administrators should use this authority to avoid liability under Title IX and to
foster a constructive educational atmosphere, without fear of running afoul of the
First Amendment.
Unfortunately, surveys on sexual harassment funded by the American Association
of University Women (AAUW) suggest that the adoption of anti-harassment policies
is merely the first step in combating sexual harassment. In contrast to a similar study
conducted in 1993, a 2001 AAUW survey indicates that many more students are

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. at 266.
Id. (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Fraser,478 U.S. at 686).
Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 267.
Id. (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382).
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Id. at 268.
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aware that their schools have sexual harassment policies.3"° Little has changed,
however, in the high levels of peer sexual harassment in public schools during this
same time period. 30 ' Thus, even though sexual harassment policies are in place and
students are aware of them, the problem persists. One factor that particularly inhibits
a school's ability to address sexual harassment is the reluctance of students to
discuss incidents of peer harassment with teachers or other school officials. 2 The
AAUW study recommends that "parents, educators, and activists focus on changing
the culture of harassment in schools and promoting students' use of existing
resources to address the problem. '3 3 The AAUW suggests implementing programs
that "spur changes in behavior and not just policy. '' 3° Several non-profit
organizations have designed such systematic approaches to address sexual
harassment.3 5 Given this research and the availability of resources, school
administrators should look beyond minimal legal requirements and consider
implementing such programs. Finding ways to encourage respectful and appropriate
speech and behavior in public schools should complement an anti-harassment policy
in achieving the goal of eliminating sexual harassment from the public schools
setting without unnecessarily restricting student free-speech rights.
Administrators may be especially hesitant to address the same-sex harassment
issue, both in anti-harassment policies and in educational programs. While such
reluctance is understandable, 6 several sources indicate that schools must address
this category of harassment. First, several federal courts have held schools liable for

300. American Association of University Women Educational Foundation, supra note 274, at 3.
Two findings stand out dramatically from 1993: Students today are much more likely to say their
schools have a sexual harassment policy or their schools distribute literature on sexual
harassment. Seven in 10 students say yes, their schools have a policy on sexual harassment,
while more than one-third say yes, their schools distribute literature about this issue. Both
findings represent substantial increases over 1993, when the plurality of students answered the
same question with either no or I'm not sure.
Id.
301. Id. (The survey indicates that sexual harassment is as common as it was in 1993, with "eight in 10
students experienc[ing] some form of sexual harassment at some time during their school lives.").
302. Id. at 14 ("Not even half (40 percent) of students say they would be likely to complain to a school adult
if they were sexually harassed by another student.").
303. Id. at 44.
304. Id.
305. See generally National Education Association, National Bullying Awareness Campaign, at http://www.
nea.org/schoolsafety/bullying.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2003); American Association of University Women
Educational Foundation, Harassment-Free Hallways: How to Stop Sexual Harassment in Schools, at http://
www.aauw.org7000lef/harass/pdf/forschools.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2003); National Alliance for Safe Schools,
Workshops, at http://www.safeschools.org/workshop.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2003); American Civil Liberties
Union, Every Student, Every School: Making Schools Safe for LGBT Youth, at http://archive.aclu.orglissues/gayl
safe_schools.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2003); Parents, Families & Friends of Lesbians & Gays, Schools & Youth,
at http://www.pflag.org/education/schools.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2003); Lesbian and Straight Education Network,
Resource Center: School Safety, at http://www.glsen.org/templates/resources/index.html?section=14 (last visited
Mar. 9,2003); Lambda Legal, Youth and Schools, athttp://www.lanbdalegal.orgcgi-binliowaissues/reocd?record=
12 (last visited Mar. 9, 2003). See also Scott Hirschfeld, Moving Beyond the Safety Zone: A Staff Development
Approach to Anti-Heterosexist Education, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 611 (2001); Thomas A. Mayes, Confronting
Same-Sex, Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment: Recommendations for Educators and Policy Makers, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 641 (2001).
306. Anti-gay bias exists among students, teachers, parents, community leaders, and school administrators
themselves. See generally Hirschfeld, supra note 305; Mayes, supra note 305.
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same-sex harassment under Title IX.307 Significantly, same-sex Title IX claims have
reached such a level of viability that the defendants in Henkle did not challenge the
claim, only the availability of punitive damages." 8 In addition, in issuing Title IX
guidance, the U.S. Department of Education has recognized that under certain
circumstances, a school could be held liable for "sexual harassment directed at gay
or lesbian students.""3 9 Finally, no student, regardless of sexual orientation should
be subjected to the kind of treatment Derek Henkle endured at the hands of his
classmates.

307. See supra part ll.B.
308. Henkle, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 1077-78.
309. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE:
HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES 3 (2001) available at

http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/shguide/.

